Four strategic priorities for climate research and action in 2025 – and one for think-tanks and public authorities

(This is intended to be a slightly provocative piece, loosely based on two recent seminars, one at the University of Sussex (source), mostly focused on data, and the other at ODIOverseas Development Institute (London) Global (source), mostly focused on policy).

The context is that temperature is rising, extreme weather events are proliferating, and climate action is stalling, in some cases reversing. The budget to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees, and even 2 degrees, is rapidly running out.

As table 1 shows, we had 150Gt of CO2 in hand to limit warming to 1.5 degrees (with 67% probability) and 900 Gt for 2 degrees, both from 1 January 2024. CO2 emissions are currently running at about 43 Gt per annum, so the figures from 1 January 2025 were about 107 Gt and 853 Gt respectively. That means the budget for 1.5 runs out on 13 July 2028. Except it will run out before that, because methane emissions are rising, whereas the calculations assume a 30% cut between 2020 and 2030.  There are complications to do with multi-decadal warming averages, the scope for limited overshoot, the pace of future carbon dioxide removal, and the time frame for calculating global warming potential (GWP), but the picture is grim. What are the implications? There are four.

Table 1

Remaining carbon budget

Source: https://essd.copernicus.org/articles/16/2625/2024/

Incentives and sanctions will be needed to persuade developing  countries to cut emissions

First, emissions have to fall in low and middle income countries as well as rich ones. If the next round of voluntary NDCs, due this year, does not deliver on the scale required, then forceful action will be needed to craft incentives and sanctions which change policy. Ambitious emissions trading regimes should be welcomed, and large-scale carbon border adjustments.

Of course, developed countries should be more ambitious. And of course, it does not help to leave the UNFCCC and cut climate research. However, the scale of cuts required for developed countries to shoulder all the burden is infeasible. Consider Figure 1, which shows the fair share and cost-effective range of cuts required to reach 1.5 and 2 degree targets. It shows that cuts in the region of 60% by 2035 from 2019 are required for 1.5 degrees, and 40% for 2 degrees, for the whole of the G20, including the BRICs. For developed countries only, the cuts would be much larger, and much steeper than the arguably stringent pathways to net zero already embedded in policy. Note that current NDCs show no reduction at all to 2030.

Figure 1

Fair-share and cost-effective pathways to the Paris temperature target (G20 countries)

Source: https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2024

Developing countries will face critical and painful decisions about how to manage carbon-constrained development. India is a good example, with per capita emissions currently well below those of other large economies, and needing to remain so (Figure 2). But a real challenge will relate to countries which hope to exploit newly discovered oil and gas reserves: in Pakistan, Guyana, Namibia, Cote d’Ivoire and elsewhere. As Figure 3 shows, the world already has enough extractive infrastructure to exceed the 1.5 degree budget by a large margin, and pretty well enough to exceed the 2 degree margin; and enough consuming infrastructure easily to exceed 1.5 degrees. Conclusion? Oil and gas are a potent development resource for poor countries, but really cannot be exploited.

Figure 2

Emissions trends of major emitters

Source: https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/43922/EGR2023.pdf

Figure 3

Extraction and Consuming Infrastructure

Source: https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/43922/EGR2023.pdf

It remains an open question what size and combination of incentives and sanctions will be needed. This is partly a question for collective action theory and specialists in international relations. Figure 4 lists the levers of collective action.

Figure 4

The levers of collective action

Source: https://brill.com/view/journals/gg/11/4/article-p415_2.xml

Obviously, incentives are preferable. For developing countries, there is potential in debt for climate swaps; and in general for generous finance with a high degree of conditionality. That is a challenge to the conventional wisdom in aid circles.

The key starting point is for developing countries to prepare comprehensive conditional NDCs, which look not just at short-term measures to cut emissions, but at longer-term development pathways with and without fossil fuels. That means a step-change in the scope and quality of NDCs.

Cost-benefit analysis will move in favour of more spending on adaptation

Second, rising temperatures are likely to play havoc with the national risk register of every country. Adaptation needs to be assessed alongside other risks, like cybersecurity or vulnerabilities in energy systems (remember Heathow, brought to a standstill by a fire in a sub-station? Or the recent disruption of electricity supplies in Spain?). Figure 5 shows the table of contents of the UK risk register for 2025. Natural hazards do not even appear until Pg 126.

Figure 5

Table of contents of the UK Risk Register

Source: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67b5f85732b2aab18314bbe4/National_Risk_Register_2025.pdf

However, adaptation needs are rising: the adaptation finance gap is estimated at US$187-359 billion per year. How will this be reflected in the risk register and in national budget decision-making?

Cost-benefit analysis is the default, setting adaptation spending alongside other priorities. But, as the Adaptation Gap Report notes,

‘Objectives. There is no single agreed quantitative goal for adaptation. The costs of adaptation vary with the objective and whether this is based on economic efficiency, acceptable risk levels or reducing impacts to current levels. This also determines residual damages, which are relevant for losses and damages.

Uncertainty. There is high uncertainty around the future risks of climate change and thus the amount and cost of adaptation needed. This arises from alternative future emission and socioeconomic scenarios, alternative climate models as well as from uncertainty around the level of (physical) climate impacts.

Coverage and boundaries. Adaptation costs vary with the coverage of sectors and the risks as well as the boundaries e.g. whether to include costs to address existing natural climate variability and extremes, and whether general development is included (e.g. activities to increase household incomes). ‘

More generally, the UK Orange Book on risk management says that

‘Options may involve one or more of the following:

• avoiding the risk, if feasible, by deciding not to start or continue with the activity that gives rise to the risk;
• taking or increasing the risk in order to pursue an opportunity;
• retaining the risk by informed decision;
• changing the likelihood, where possible;
• changing the consequences, including planning contingency activities;
• sharing the risk (e.g. through commercial contracts);

. . .

Selecting the most appropriate risk treatment option(s) involves balancing the potential benefits derived in enhancing the achievement of objectives against the costs, efforts or disadvantages of proposed actions. Justification for the design of risk treatments and the operation of internal control is broader than solely economic considerations and should take into account all of the organisation’s obligations, commitments and stakeholder views.’

All that begs a few questions. What level of national and local action and spending will deliver the ‘appropriate’ amount of adaptation action? ODI Global has resources on risk and resilience which explore that question further.

Behaviour change is the quick win, and needs active management

Third, behaviour change is the quick win. It is a weakness of the international climate framework that it focuses on territorial not consumption emissions. In the UK, imported emissions account for about half of total consumption emissions, but are outside the scope of the NDC. In developing countries, by contrast, manufacturing for export, national consumption emissions are often below territorial emissions.

However, individuals with high consumption emissions are not just found in rich countries. Globally, the top 10% of income earners account for about 50% of emissions (Figure 6, and see also data from the World Inequality Report). The income needed to be in that category in 2015 was $US 38,000 in 2011 PPP dollars.

Figure 6

Inequality of consumption emissions

Source: https://wedocs.unep.org/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/34432/EGR20ch6.pdf

It is not difficult to list the actions needed to reduce consumption emissions: fly less, eat less meat and dairy, buy less stuff, and so on: ‘Reduce, Re-use, Recycle’, ‘Avoid, Shift, Improve’, or in an alternative formulation, ‘Shrink, Shift, Shuffle’. More difficult is to design programmes which will encourage behaviour change.

Figure 7 illustrates the range of factors to consider. A recent Briefing Paper by Natasha Parker concludes that

• ‘There are many barriers to behaviour change. High emission lifestyles are seen as aspirational. Change is also often seen as too expensive, too inconvenient, too difficult, or sometimes just too socially strange.
• But there are also positive reasons to change: improved health and wellbeing through cleaner air, more active lifestyles, warmer homes and healthier food. People who live more sustainably report higher well-being.
• Behaviour change interventions can create a world where sustainable choices are the easy, affordable, normal, and desirable default. By offering downstream, midstream and upstream options, they give people the capability, opportunity and motivation to change. There are practical examples to learn from – in the UK and overseas.
• A comprehensive behaviour change strategy for . . . should identify key changes for a fair transition, assess upstream, midstream and downstream policies, build public understanding, and foster a sense of shared ownership.’

Figure 7

Drivers of behaviour change

Source: https://wedocs.unep.org/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/34432/EGR20ch6.pdf

Footprinting can provide a way in to discussion with individuals and households. A personal lifetime carbon budget can be a sobering tool: a calculation carried out in 2023 suggested a lifetime allowance globally of 100 t for 1.5 degrees and 200 t for 2 degrees. For the UK, where emissions are currently about 10t per person per year, that allowance would run out very quickly, more so if the UK, as a developed country, was expected to cut emissions faster than the global average.

It is worth noting that the UK Climate Change Committee has recently recommended setting a ‘benchmark’ for consumption emissions (Box 1). It has also noted the value of demand-side measures like those listed above.

Box 1

A benchmark for imported emissions

Source: https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/the-seventh-carbon-budget/

Focus on trade-offs in climate compatible development

Fourth, ‘climate compatible development’ (Figure 5) is the key to unlocking achievement of the multi-sectoral Sustainable Development Goals, and it is routine to say that greening the economy will deliver good jobs and health co-benefits as well as reducing emissions. However, as the literature on CCD makes clear, it is not axiomatic that there are no trade-offs. A more general literature on green growth further explores this question. As Paul Johnson, Director of the Institute of Fiscal Studies observed in 2024,

‘‘If you had £5 billion a year to put into the most growth-friendly policy, it is unlikely that green investment is what you’d choose. This might or might not be the right priority, but it is not the same priority as growth.’

Figure 8

Climate Compatible Development

Source: https://cdkn.org/ sites/default/files/files/CDKN-CCD-Planning_english.pdf

This topic has been explored in a discussion hosted by Climate:Change. The general conclusion is that good policy is key, focusing on innovation and long-term transformation. Dirk Willem te Velde summarises the conclusion as follows:

‘Good green industrial policy can have significant growth benefits (including compared to current baseline policy), and an emphasis on sustained growth can be green (including compared to the current baseline) depending on what it includes and whether and how it is implemented effectively. In either case, an emphasis on economic transformation (as opposed to more of the same) is essential. ‘

The discussion also showed, however, that transition costs can disadvantage some groups. Hence transition assistance and social protection are important. Stephane Hallegatte from the World Bank observes in the discussion that

‘Because low-emission development scenarios systematically require higher investments and lower operational costs, the short-term impact on household consumptions is larger than on GDP.  . . .  It . . . shows importance of appropriate compensation and social interventions to protect poor people’s consumption and facilitate a just transition for the workers and communities affected by climate policies.’

There is a Climate:Change  Briefing Paper on economic development which takes up these issues, co-authored by Max te Velde, Dirk te Velde and me. It identifies four scenarios for economic transformation and a green economy, aiming at a ‘Green Beacon’ solution which delivers both (Figure 9).  See also the discussion on degrowth hosted by Development Policy Review.

Figure 9

Scenarios for economic transformation and a green economy

Source: https://www.climatechangebh.org.uk/perspectives/a-green-beacon-how-to-deliver-climate-compatible-development-in-brighton-and-hove

Think-tanks (and public authorities) need a cross-cutting task force on climate action

Finally, and briefly, it is notable from the above that climate action is unavoidably cross-cutting. Climate science, climate finance and climate-specific actions, of course. But also: international relations to deal with crafting global consensus; management of the risk register and of the budget to manage adaptation; behavioural psychology and nudge economics to incentivize behaviour change; industrial policy to manage trade-offs in climate compatible development; and so on.

This breadth can pose a challenge to think-tanks, illustrated by a ‘pizza-night’ training case (Box 2). The solution, as the case notes indicate, involve leadership, strategy, business planning, personal target-setting, and incentive and reward structures.

Similar challenges face Governments and local councils.

Box 2

A ‘pizza-night training case on managing climate change as a cross-cutting issue in a think-tank