

Re-thinking the concept of fragile states

Simon Maxwell

The argument

This is the story of how I was intrigued by the different definitions of ‘fragile states’. I wanted to understand how we could be talking in the same breath about war-torn countries, like, say, Yemen; and climate vulnerable countries, like, say, the Marshall Islands; and countries with weak institutions, like, say, Burundi. I quickly became frustrated, and finally reached some radical conclusions:

First, that there are too many lists, with too many different definitions, and insufficient country overlap. Furthermore, some of the definitions are too wide, and some of the lists are too long. There are lines of causality linking different kinds of fragility, of course, but a conversation which puts all into the same pot loses focus. The debate risks sinking into a morass of generalisations.

Second, that the main challenge to traditional ways the aid industry does business is in conflict countries, and that it would be no bad thing to restrict the class of fragile states to those currently or likely to be conflict-affected, and possibly those just recovering from conflict. In these cases, there are genuine dilemmas about: tackling the drivers of conflict; the interface between development and humanitarian actors and warring parties; the role of peace-making and peace-keeping forces; and the transition from war to peace.

Third, that even here there are multiple and competing criteria, with different lists and different country coverage. The whole business of drawing up top down, data-driven categories and lists is fraught with difficulty.

Fourth, a better approach would be to use expert panels and participatory methods to develop flexible, up-to-date and relevant targets for analysis and intervention.

Fifth, the over-burdened concept of fragile states has become debased; and the concept of conflict-affected states should be restricted to the egregious cases.


And, sixth, this would allow everyone to focus bottom up on the dilemmas listed above, wherever they occur.

Reviewing the approaches

I began by assembling the lists from the [World Bank](#), [DFID](#), the [New Deal](#), and the recent OECD/DAC [States of Fragility](#) Report. There are others, as we shall see. Interestingly, the [Cameron Commission on fragile states](#), which reported earlier this year, eschewed lists altogether. In the four cases cited, there are 80 countries listed (plus, in DFID’s case, three whole regions): that is well over half the total number of countries on the OECD/DAC aid recipients list (currently 143). Only 13 countries appear on all four lists, and only a further 15 on three of the four. See the Venn diagram in Figure 1 (for country abbreviations, see Appendix 1).

Figure 1

Venn diagram of fragile and conflict-affected states



Sources: see text

For reference, the table in Appendix 1 shows which countries appear on which list – and this table is the source for the Venn diagram in Figure 1.

As noted, the Cameron Commission did not have a list.

The [New Deal](#) is a voluntary agreement involving fragile and conflict-affected states, to which countries sign up. According to the website, there are 18 developing country members.

The World Bank ‘Harmonized List of Fragile Situations’ is based on CPIA scores (CPIA being the [Country Policy and Institutional Assessment](#)), also including countries with UN or regional peace-keeping or peace-building missions. It includes data from the African and Asian Development Banks. There is more detail in the footnotes to the table in Appendix 2.


The DFID list is taken from the 2016 [Bilateral Development Review](#), with the key information found in the background [Technical Note](#). The relevant page is reproduced in Appendix 3.

Fragile States are divided into three categories (high, medium and low), with an additional list of eligible countries which neighbour high fragility states. This gives a total list of 64, plus three regions designated as ‘fragile’, namely the Middle East, South of Sahara and North of Sahara. The Note cites data sources, but does not spell out the methodology. It also says that the list will be updated regularly: I have no information on whether this has yet been done. Independently of DFID, the UK Foreign Office runs the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, which has operations in 70 countries, some of which (e.g. Morocco) are not on the DFID list. See Appendix 4.

The DAC list comes from the [State of Fragility Report](#), first published with this title in 2015, and designed to provide a more comprehensive view than previously attempted of political, societal, economic, environmental and security-related fragility. Some 60 countries were scored on each of these five dimensions, giving a multi-dimensional picture of fragility. The data were updated in 2018, giving the picture in Figure 2. The methodology is summarised in the [2016 report](#) (which incidentally was focused on violence): Pgs 74 ff and Appendices from Pg 152. Inter alia, one learns that quite a few countries were missed out for lack of data (Figure 3): some of these appear on other lists of fragile states. In a key feature, the DAC scores each country on each of the five dimensions of fragility, allowing for disaggregated analysis. The 2018 scores are given in Appendix 5.

Figure 2

OECD Fragility Framework 2018



Source: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/states-of-fragility-2018-9789264302075-en.htm>

Figure 3

Box 3.4. Countries and territories not included in the fragility framework

Data availability is a key issue in calculating the OECD fragility framework. As the unit of analysis is the state or territory it is important to select indicators that are comparable across those states and territories. Statistical imputation methods can be used to fill data gaps, but that approach is best used sparingly; preference should always be given to real-world data, even if it means dropping indicators or countries and territories that otherwise would have been included. The fragility framework methodology aims to strike a balance between the number of indicators, the contexts covered and the amount of imputation that would be required to build a complete data set. A criterion for inclusion in the OECD framework was that a country or context had to have at least 70% of the required data. As a result, only 171 contexts could be included in the calculations.

This does not mean that the excluded contexts are not fragile. Indeed, many of those excluded are small island developing states that are measured as fragile in other fragility methodologies (ADB, 2012) and face their own unique challenges. In addition, the final list also excluded two territories with UN peacekeeping missions ("Kosovo" and Western Sahara) and several Pacific Island countries with well-known high levels of interpersonal violence.

The countries and territories excluded in 2016 due to insufficient data are:

Anguilla	Kiribati	Nauru	Samoa
Antigua and Barbuda	"Kosovo"	Niue	Tokelau
Belize	Malta	Palau	Tonga
Cook Islands	Marshall Islands	Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha	Turks and Caicos Islands
Dominica	Mayotte	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Tuvalu
Equatorial Guinea	Federated States of Micronesia	Saint Lucia	Wallis and Futuna
Grenada	Montserrat	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Western Sahara

Source: https://www.shareweb.ch/site/Conflict-and-Human-Rights/tools/Dokumente%20Shareweb%20von%20Excelliste/state%20of%20fragility%20report%202016_EN.pdf

In sum, there is a great deal of heterogeneity. Sebastian Zaja and Javier Fabra Mata [review the problems](#). They note that the criteria vary and that data are hard to acquire. When it comes to constructing indices, they identify other methodological problems, like the issue of weighting or the definition of thresholds.

Is a categorisation limited to conflict easier?

As noted earlier, the main challenge to traditional ways the aid industry does business is in conflict countries. Would it be easier to break the overarching concept of fragility back down to its basic elements, and focus on conflict?

To clear the decks, two useful definitions of conflict-affected and high risk areas are in Box 1, provided by the OECD and the EU (and sourced from the [Responsible Minerals Initiative](#)). Note that the EU but not the OECD references post-war fragility.

Box 1

Definitions of conflict-affected and high-risk areas

OECD definition of conflict-affected and high-risk areas: Conflict-affected and high-risk areas are identified by the presence of armed conflict, widespread violence or other risks of harm to people. Armed conflict may take a variety of forms, such as a conflict of international or non-international character, which may involve two or more states, or may consist of wars of liberation, or insurgencies, civil wars, etc. High-risk areas may include areas of political instability or repression, institutional weakness, insecurity, collapse of civil infrastructure and widespread violence. Such areas are often characterised by widespread human rights abuses and violations of national or international law.


EU definition of conflict-affected and high-risk areas: Areas in a state of armed conflict, fragile post-conflict areas, as well as areas witnessing weak or non-existing governance and security, such as failed states, and widespread and systematic violations of international law, including human rights abuses.

Source: <http://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/emerging-risks/conflict-affected-and-high-risk-areas/>

The World Bank includes a country on the list if (inter alia) there has been ‘the presence of a UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past three years’. 17 countries are identified as meeting this criterion: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, West Bank/Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon and Libya. Several of those are not in the first two categories on the DAC list (for example, Liberia, Gambia, Lebanon).

If peace missions are an indicator, the EU currently has 16 ongoing military or civilian missions (Figure 4), including Moldova and Georgia: both are eligible for oda; neither is on the DAC high priority list.

Figure 4




Source: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en

The DFID list of fragile states refers to the 'World Peace Index', presumably the [Global Peace Index](#) produced by the [Institute for Economics and Peace](#). There are 16 countries scored red in the 2018 edition of the Index, including Ukraine and Russia (Figure 5). Ukraine is not on DFID's list, though it is a country eligible for oda.

Figure 5

Global Peace Index 2018



Source: <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/06/Global-Peace-Index-2018-2.pdf>

The Global Peace Index is not the only option DFID might have chosen. The [Responsible Minerals Initiative](#) has a list of [resources and tools](#) to help companies identify conflict-affected and high-risk areas. Useful resources listed include the Global Peace Index, and also: the [Heidelberg Conflict Barometer](#); the [Control Risks Worldmap](#); and the [INFORM Worldmap](#). The States of Fragility 2016 Report mentions other sources: The George Mason University State Fragility Index; the [Fragile States Index](#) from the Fund for Peace; the [Country Indicators for Foreign Policy \(CIFP\) fragility index](#); the [Index of State Weakness in the Developing World](#); the [Global Conflict Risk Index](#) (by the way, an EU initiative); and the [Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger](#). This begins to look like an industry. Note the enthusiasm for ranking and the construction of indices. Google "'fragile states' index' and there are 250,000 hits. Check on Google Scholar and there are 16,500.

There is only limited overlap on these lists and indices also, as Sebastian Zaja and Javier Fabra Mata showed in their [paper](#) for the German Development Institute (albeit with data from 2008). The most important 'controversial' cases, which appeared on some lists but not others, included Cuba, Israel, Saudi Arabia, China and UAE.

The DAC, as noted, is best in class in our sample for the transparency of its classification. The key source is a series of Appendices in the [2016 States of Fragility Report](#). To cut a long story short, a list of indicators is subject to statistical interpretation using principal components in order to produce the classification. In the case of security, there are seven risk factors, potentially offset by five coping elements (Figure 6). Battle-related deaths, deaths by non-state actors and terrorism all feature on the list of risks, alongside criminal activity and the

homicide rate. These can be offset by numbers of soldiers and police officers, among other things. When the principal components are calculated, the key indicators are rule of law and state control of territory, followed by armed conflict, terrorism, organised crime and interpersonal violence.

Figure 6

Security indicators from the DAC States of Fragility methodology

Dimension	Type	Indicator name	Source	Description
	Risk	Homicide rate	UNODC	Intentional homicide rate per 100 000 population.
	Risk	Level of violent criminal activity	IPD	Intensity of violent activities by underground political organisations: by criminal organisations (e.g. drug trafficking, arms trafficking, prostitution, etc.).
	Risk	Deaths by non-state actors per capita	UCDP	Total of one-sided and non-state actor datasets – average per capita rate of 2011-14.
	Risk	Impact of terrorism	IEP/START	The Global Terrorism Index score for a context in a given year accounts for the relative impact of incidents in the year. Four factors are counted: number of terrorist incidents; number of fatalities caused by terrorism; number of injuries caused by terrorism; and approximate level of total property damage from terrorist incidents in a given year. It is a five-year weighted average to capture lingering fear effects.
Security	Risk	Conflict risk	GCRI	The statistical risk of violent conflict in the next 1-4 years based on 25 quantitative indicators from open sources.
	Risk	Battle-related deaths per capita (log)	UCDP-BD	Total of battle deaths.
	Risk	Restricted gender physical integrity value	OECD	Measures prevalence of laws on rape and domestic violence. Experience of violence is also captured.
	Coping	Police officers per 100 000 population	GPI	Police officers per 100 000 population.
	Coping	Armed security officers per 100 000 population	GPI	Armed security officers per 100 000 population.
	Coping	Rule of law	WGI	Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
	Coping	Control over territory	V-DEM	Over what percentage of the territory does the state have effective control?
	Coping	Formal alliances	COW	Formal alliance between at least two states that fall into the classes of defence pact, neutrality or non-aggression treaty, or entente agreement.

Source: https://www.shareweb.ch/site/Conflict-and-Human-Rights/tools/Dokumente%20Shareweb%20von%20Excelliste/state%20of%20fragility%20report%202016_EN.pdf

A relatively small number of countries on the DAC list are highly fragile for security reasons. They are: in the highest category, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya (8 countries); in the second category, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), DRC, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iran, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Palestinian Territories (22 countries).

Finding a way forward

A few points.

First, there are A LOT of lists. It is important to be pragmatic. People draw up lists for different reasons, and donors, in particular, may benefit from a certain amount of constructive ambiguity. On the other hand, it is hard to have a sensible conversation when everyone has

their own list. At the very least, people need to make their criteria explicit. Better, more harmonisation would be helpful, in order to have the kind of global conversation to which Sebastian Zaja and Javier Fabra Mata point. They [observe](#) that indices, and by extension lists, have legitimate objectives. They

‘could be of use for development policy as a tool for: determining which countries need a different aid approach; monitoring larger trends of global political stability; evaluating the overall impact of development aid; and for investigating the dynamics of state fragility.’

Second, however, the quest for quantitative rigour is very hard when data are lacking or out-of-date in many of the worst-affected countries. An alternative approach is to be less dependent on data, and to deploy it in the context of intelligence on the ground and expert knowledge. It is quite easy to imagine an exercise using the definitions in Box 1, perhaps using a panel of specialists to sift data and reach judgements about countries in conflict or at risk. James Surowiecki describes such an approach in [The Wisdom of Crowds](#) and it is being used by organisations like the World Economic Forum for the annual [Global Risks Report](#). There are also echoes of approaches used in participatory development, giving a voice to people in affected countries.

Third, using qualitative data does not rule out constructing an index, if that is thought useful. The Transparency International [Corruption Perceptions Index](#) is an example of a global index constructed from qualitative data.

Fourth, a balance is needed between, on the one hand, recognising the complex inter-relationship between the different drivers of ‘fragility’, and, on the other, keeping the focus narrow enough to be useful. The risk of drawing the boundaries too wide can be seen in the OECD States of Fragility Report 2018, the key messages of which include very general statements like ‘We will invest in more and smarter aid in fragile contexts’, ‘We will invest in the data to better understand, anticipate and respond to multiple states of fragility’, and ‘We will step up our efforts on prevention, peace and security’.

Furthermore, the universal approach risks losing sight of the underlying problems in conflict situations, which may be especially prominent in war zones, but which appear also in other places. These include, in addition to tackling the drivers of conflict: the interface between development and humanitarian actors and warring parties; the role of peace-making and peace-keeping forces; and the transition from war to peace. There is much policy-relevant work on all of those.

Conclusion

It turns out, then, that I am sympathetic to the argument that there are complex interactions between the different aspects of fragility, but sceptical about the conceptual and practical problems of building statistical models which will describe and, importantly, predict fragility.

It is possible to think of alternative approaches, using expert panels and participatory approaches, tailored to the needs of different actors. These should definitely be tried.

The focus, however, could usefully be redirected to the substantive issues which arise in conflict states, but also elsewhere.

Which raises the final question, of whether the term 'fragile states' has become debased. Too much has been loaded onto it. The term 'conflict-affected state' has longer legs, but also needs to be defined with care and restricted to the egregious cases.

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Appendix 1

		WB	DAC	DFID	New Deal
Afghanistan	AFG	x	x	x	x
Algeria	DZA		x	x	
Angola	AGO	x	x	x	
Armenia	ARM			x	
Azerbaijan	AZE			x	
Bangladesh	BGD		x	x	
Belarus	BLR			x	
Burkina Faso	BFA		x		
Burundi	BDI	x	x	x	
Cambodia	KHM			x	
Cameroon	CMR		x	x	
Central African Republic	CAF	x	x	x	x
Chad	TCD	x	x	x	x
Colombia	COL			x	
Comoros	COM	x	x		x
Congo (Brazzaville)	COG	x	x	x	
Congo, (Kinshasa)	COD	x	x	x	x
Côte d'Ivoire	CM	x	x	x	x
Cyprus	CY	x	x	x	
Egypt	EGY		x	x	
Equatorial Guinea	GNQ		x		
Eritrea	ERI	x	x	x	
Ethiopia	ETH		x	x	
Gambia	GMB	x	x		
Guatemala	GTM		x		
Guinea	GIN		x	x	x
Guinea-Bissau	GNB	x	x	x	x
Haiti	HTI	x	x	x	x
Honduras	HND		x	x	
Iran, Islamic Republic of	IRN		x	x	
Iraq	IRQ	x	x	x	
Jordan	JOR			x	
Kenya	KEN		x	x	
Kiribati	KIR	x			
Korea (North)	PRK		x	x	
Kyrgyzstan	KGZ			x	
Laos PDR	LAO		x	x	
Lebanon	LBN	x		x	x
Liberia	LSR	x	x	x	x
Libya	LSY	x	x	x	
Madagascar	MDG		x	x	
Malawi	MWI		x		
Maldives	MDV	x	x	x	x
Marshall Islands	MHL	x		x	
Mauritania	MRT		x	x	
Micronesia, Federated States of	FSM	x			
Mozambique	MOZ	x	x		
Myanmar	MMR	x		x	
Nepal	NPL		x	x	
Niger	NER		x	x	
Nigeria	NGA		x	x	
Pakistan	PAK		x	x	
Palestine Territory	PSE	x	x	x	
Papua New Guinea	PNG	x	x	x	
Paraguay	PRY			x	
Rwanda	RWA		x	x	
Sierra Leone	SLE		x	x	x
Solomon Islands	SLB	x	x	x	x
Somalia	SOM	x	x	x	x
South Sudan	SSD	x	x	x	x
Sudan	SDN	x	x	x	
Swaziland	SWZ		x		
Syrian Arab Republic (Syria)	SYR	x	x	x	
Tajikistan	TJK			x	
Tanzania, United Republic of	TZA		x	x	
Thailand	THA			x	
Timor-Leste	TLS	x	x	x	x
Togo	TGO	x		x	x
Tunisia	TUN			x	
Turkey	TUR			x	
Turkmenistan	TKM			x	
Turkmenistan	TUV	x			
Uganda	UGA		x	x	
Ukraine	UKR			x	
Uzbekistan	UZB			x	
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic)	VEN		x	x	
Yemen	YEM	x	x	x	x
Zambia	ZMB		x	x	
Zimbabwe	ZWE	x	x	x	
Zanzibar	ZAN	x			

Harmonized List of Fragile Situations FY 19 a/						
Country	WBG CPIA	ADB CPIA	AFDB CPIA	Harmonized Average	Peacekeeping Missions b/	Political & Peacebuilding Missions c/
IDA Eligible						
Afghanistan	2.68	2.78		2.73		P
Burundi	2.91		3.11	3.01		
Central African Republic	2.48		2.48	2.48		P
Chad	2.66		3.23	2.94		
Comoros	2.81		2.12	2.46		
Congo, Dem. Rep.	2.83		3.25	3.04	PK	
Congo, Rep	2.70		3.28	2.99		
Côte d'Ivoire	3.38		3.71	3.54	PK	
Djibouti	2.97		3.30	3.13		
Eritrea	1.85		2.13	1.99		
Gambia, The	2.97		2.94	2.95	PK	
Guinea-Bissau	2.45		2.63	2.54		P
Haiti	2.88			2.88	PK	
Kiribati	2.99	2.94		2.97		
Kosovo	3.57			3.57	PK	
Liberia	3.13		3.36	3.24	PK	
Mali	3.40		3.74	3.57	PK	
Marshall Islands	2.60	2.88		2.74		
Micronesia, Fed. Sts	2.75	2.88		2.82		
Mozambique	3.17		3.16	3.16		
Myanmar	3.00	3.31		3.15		
Solomon Islands	2.93	3.23		3.08		
Somalia						P
South Sudan	1.53		1.86	1.69	PK	
Sudan	2.38		2.56	2.47	PK	
Syria						
Togo	3.13		3.19	3.16		
Tuvalu	2.90	3.02		2.96		
Yemen, Rep.	2.11			2.11		
Territories						
West Bank and Gaza						P
Blend						
Papua New Guinea	2.96	2.86		2.91		
Timor-Leste	2.85	3.46		3.15		
Zimbabwe	2.78		2.66	2.72		
IBRD Only						
Iraq						P
Lebanon						P
Libya						P

a/ "Fragile Situations" have: either a) a harmonized average CPIA country rating of 3.2 or less, or b) the presence of a UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past three years. This list includes only IDA eligible countries and non-member or inactive territories/countries without CIA data. IBRD countries with CPIA ratings below 3.200 do not qualify on this list due to non disclosure of CPIA ratings; IBRD countries that are included here qualify only by the presence of a peacekeeping, political or peace-building mission - and their CPIA ratings are thus not quoted here

b/ Specifically defined as the presence of a UN and/or regional (eg: AU, EU, OAS, NATO) peace-keeping operation in this country in the last three years, with the exclusion of border monitoring operations [sources: UN DPKO, AU, EC, websites] For additional information regarding this list, please read the FCS Information Note and FAQ found on our website: www.worldbank.org/fragilityandconflict

c/ Specifically defined as the presence of a UN and/or regional (eg: AU, EU, OAS) peace-building and political mission in this country in the last three years [sources: UN DPKO, AU, EU websites]

Source: <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/892921532529834051/FCList-FY19-Final.pdf>

DFID Fragile States Methodology

3. Fragile states methodology

The Bilateral Development Review assessed the shape of our geographical footprint, looking at where DFID currently operates, what role we should play and how. As set out in the Strategic Defence and Security Review and the UK Aid Strategy, **DFID is committed to spending at least 50% of our budget in fragile states and regions in every year of this Parliament.**

Building the evidence base - approach to defining fragile states and regions

We have identified fragile states and regions that: suffer external and social stresses that are particularly likely to result in violence; lack the capacity to manage conflict without violence; and neighbouring states that are especially susceptible to instability.

Our assessment of fragile states is based on open-source data from a range of sources, including the World Bank, United Nations and the World Peace Index. Our full list of fragile states and regions (below), which we will update regularly to reflect changes in the data, includes:

- countries on DFID's fragile states list
- Overseas Development Assistance eligible countries neighbouring high fragility states (excluding China and India)
- 3 specifically designated fragile regions, which contain many of the fragile states on DFID's list

Table A: List of fragile states and regions

High fragility	Moderate fragility	Low fragility	Neighbouring high fragility states	Regions
Afghanistan	Bangladesh	Liberia	Jordan	Middle East
Burma	Ethiopia	Nepal	Rwanda	South of Sahara
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Kenya	Sierra Leone	Tanzania	North of Sahara
Iraq	Kyrgyz Republic	Uganda	Zambia	
Pakistan	Lebanon	Cameroon	Thailand	
Somalia	Nigeria	Belarus	Algeria	
South Sudan	Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) ¹	Cambodia	Armenia	
Sudan	Tajikistan	Colombia	Laos	
Syrian Arab Republic	Zimbabwe	Congo, Rep.	Tunisia	
Yemen, Rep.	Angola	Côte D'Ivoire	Turkey	
Central African Republic	Azerbaijan	Djibouti		
Libya	Egypt, Arab Rep.	Honduras		
Burundi	Guinea	Madagascar		
Chad	Guinea-Bissau	Mauritania		
Eritrea	Haiti	Niger		
Iran, Islamic Rep.	Mali	Paraguay		
Korea, Dem. Rep.	Turkmenistan	Timor-Leste		
	Uzbekistan	Ukraine		
	Venezuela			

¹ The OPTs are a non-member observer state at the UN.

Source:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/573890/Bilateral-Development_Review-technical-note-2016.pdf

Countries of operation of the UK Conflict, Security and Stability Fund

‘The CSSF is in over 70 countries including: Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burma, Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia , Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Mali, Morocco, Moldova, Nepal, Nigeria, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Pakistan , Peru, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine and Yemen. The CSSF also works in the UK Overseas Territories.’

Source: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-cssf/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-an-overview#where-the-cssf-delivers>

Appendix 5

Figure 2.1. OECD fragility framework 2018							
country	fragile	extremely fragil	Dimensional fragility levels				
			economic	environmental	societal	political	security
Somalia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
South Sudan	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Yemen	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
Iraq	1	1	1	2	1	2	1
Afghanistan	1	1	1	2	1	2	1
Libya	1	0	1	3	2	2	1
Congo	1	0	1	2	1	1	2
Mauritania	1	0	1	2	1	1	2
Central African Republic	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
Haiti	1	1	1	2	1	2	2
Pakistan	1	0	1	2	1	2	2
Niger	1	0	1	1	3	2	2
Mali	1	1	1	1	3	2	2
Comoros	1	0	1	2	3	4	2
Gambia	1	0	1	2	1	1	3
Guinea-Bissau	1	0	1	1	3	2	3
Sierra Leone	1	0	1	1	3	2	3
Liberia	1	0	1	1	3	2	3
Mozambique	1	0	1	1	3	2	3
Honduras	1	0	1	3	3	2	3
Swaziland	1	0	1	1	1	3	3
Tajikistan	1	0	1	2	2	3	3
Solomon Islands	1	0	1	2	3	4	3
Timor-Leste	1	0	1	2	3	4	3
Djibouti	1	0	1	2	2	1	4
Chad	1	1	2	1	1	1	2
Burundi	1	1	2	1	1	1	2
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1	1	2	1	1	1	2
Eritrea	1	1	2	2	1	1	2
Ethiopia	1	1	2	2	1	1	2
Myanmar	1	0	2	2	2	2	2
Burkina Faso	1	0	2	1	3	2	2
Cameroon	1	0	2	1	1	3	2
Nepal	1	0	2	2	3	4	2
Zimbabwe	1	0	2	2	1	1	3
Guinea	1	0	2	1	2	1	3
Madagascar	1	0	2	2	3	1	3
Uganda	1	0	2	2	1	2	3
Equatorial Guinea	1	0	2	4	1	3	3
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1	0	2	2	2	3	3
Zambia	1	0	2	1	3	4	3
Malawi	1	0	2	1	3	4	3
Papua New Guinea	1	0	2	2	3	4	3
Tanzania	1	0	2	2	3	4	3
Rwanda	1	0	2	2	1	2	4
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1	0	2	2	1	1	5
Kenya	1	0	4	2	1	2	2
Nigeria	1	0	4	2	3	2	2
Angola	1	0	4	2	1	1	3
Bangladesh	1	0	4	2	2	1	3
Venezuela	1	0	4	3	2	1	3
Côte d'Ivoire	1	0	4	1	3	2	3
Guatemala	1	0	4	2	1	4	3
Sudan	1	1	5	2	1	1	1
Iran	1	0	5	3	1	1	2
West Bank and Gaza Strip	1	0	5	3	1	1	2
Egypt	1	0	5	3	1	2	2

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