What did Tony Blair get right (on climate)?

The climate change report for the Tony Blair Institute by Lindy Fursman, with a Foreword by Tony Blair, landed badly – and mainly because of TB’s assertion in the Foreword that

‘the debate has become irrational . . .  present policy solutions are inadequate and, worse, are distorting the debate into a quest for a climate platform that is unrealistic and therefore unworkable  . . . (and) that any strategy based on either phasing out fossil fuels in the short term or limiting consumption is a strategy doomed to fail.’

It seems a bit unfair to Lindy Fursman that the Foreword has eclipsed the actual report. It is worth examining the totality of the argument.

Fursman is not a climate change denier. However, she argues that the world has passed through an Era of Activism and an Era of Optimism on climate and has arrived at an Era of Apathy. She argues that

‘the Paris Agreement was perhaps the last moment when the politics of the climate transition aligned with the economic conditions that would enable the “easy” delivery of decarbonisation, and the peak of global alignment on the necessity of the transition ahead. Following the signing of the Agreement, the commitment to the transition and the political consensus around it started to erode.’

Further

‘as the global economic conditions that had enabled progress began to shift and financial constraints tightened, the enthusiasm that had defined the Optimism Era started to wane. This shift in economic conditions also brought attention to the costs borne by individuals, as the costs of carbon pricing started to have impacts, and policies aimed at sustainability necessitated upfront investments or changes in consumption patterns. . . The low hanging fruit has been harvested. Much of what remains is complex, costly, or politically sensitive. At the same time, rising emissions in China and India make domestic action in smaller economies seem futile, even though these economies collectively match China’s emissions.’

And, finally, the UNFCCC is not fit for purpose and ‘the world needs a new approach to multilateralism that either sits beside or replaces the UNFCCC/COP process’.

What needs to be done? The Report makes seven recommendations for a new Era of Disruption:

1.      Accelerating and scaling technologies that capture carbon.

2.      Harnessing the power of technology AI.

3.      Investing in breakthrough and frontier energy solutions.

4.      Scaling nature-based solutions.

5.      Adapting to what is coming.

6.      Simplifying global efforts to deliver collective action.

7.      Rethinking the role of finance, including philanthropy.

TB amplifies these points. He argues, that

‘None of this invalidates the inconvenient truth that the climate is changing, and to our detriment – or that this is one of the fundamental challenges of our time. Nor does it mean we shouldnt continue to deploy renewable energy, which is both necessary and cost effective. But it does mean we need to alter where we put our focus and resources. . . . We need solutions that match the scale of the challenge and a new politics to get them done.’

This is a perspective worth debating. As it happens, I made my own ‘slightly provocative’ contribution to the debate a few days before the TBI Report came out, with four strategic priorities for climate action in 2025. There is some overlap with the TBI priorities, but there are also points of divergence.

The urgency of cutting emissions and exploiting fossil fuels – especially in emerging economies

First, TBI are right to say that emerging economies are the drivers of rising emissions; the graphs are in my piece. TBI are right also that emerging economies need more energy in order to develop. They might have added that many emerging economies hope to rely on the export of oil and gas to provide the finance for development, further entrenching a commitment to fossil fuels.

What TBI do not acknowledge is the urgency of cutting emissions if the Paris targets are to remain remotely within reach. I suggested 13 July 2028 as the date when the budget available to limit warming to 1.5 degrees would definitively be passed, noting that the failure to curb methane emissions would advance the date. That is imprecise, of course, intended heuristically, but important because it illustrates limits to the scope for the longer-term technological solutions TBI prioritise. We may well need more carbon capture and storage, and more carbon dioxide removal, but none of the options is likely to be available in the time or at the scale required – and never mind their cost, in absolute terms or in comparison to the cost of acting now to reduce emissions.

There are implications with respect to emerging economies, explored in my contribution. How can the theory of international relations and collective action theory be applied to to design incentives and maybe sanctions that will persuade emerging economies to leave oil and gas in the ground? This is a suitable topic for the ‘new politics’ TBI advocates.

Behaviour change as a – maybe the – quick win to reduce emissions

Second, if the priority is to cut emissions quickly, TBI are remiss in not paying more attention to measures which will cut consumption. The Report is dismissive of such measures:

‘many governments prioritised regulatory interventions, such as energy-efficiency standards and product labelling. These measures sought to encourage sustainable consumption while minimising immediate financial strain on households and businesses. However, none of the domestically focused policies were able to deliver the key goal – namely a halt to the constant rise in global emissions.’

The logic is convoluted. Did anyone ever think that imposing higher vehicle emission standards or mandating low energy lightbulbs would solve the climate crisis at a stroke? Of course not. Did such measures help prevent emissions rising even faster than they actually did? Undoubtedly. My view is that behaviour change is the quick win – possibly the only quick win - in climate action, in both developed and developing economies. System change which supports behaviour change is of course essential, including e.g. the labelling TBI disparage. See the Climate:Change Briefing Paper on behaviour change by Natasha Parker, here.

The co-benefits of climate action

Third, on a related point, TBI have nothing to say about the health and other co-benefits of climate action – valuable in themselves, but also as drivers of individual and community support. As an example, see the Climate:Change Briefing Paper on air pollution by Nicky Lumb, here. She points out that air pollution, closely linked to the burning of fossil fuels, is the second leading cause of death globally, ahead of both tobacco and poor diet.

There are other co-benefits of climate action, notably environmental. The Report is enthusiastic about the mitigation potential of nature-based solutions, but could usefully have made the link to biodiversity, which provides additional impetus for investment in forests, wetlands and nature more generally.

Adaptation, yes, but in the context of the national and global risk register

Fourth, the Report is right to call for greater attention to adaptation, also a point I made in my contribution – and one the Climate Change Committee made in its most recent Report to Parliament on adaptation. However, resilience and adaptation need to be assessed in the context of the national risk register as a whole, indeed the global risk register as a whole. It would have been useful for the TBI Report to contextualise, and for its author to think a little more about the need to accelerate emissions reduction in the short term so as to reduce loss and damage in the medium and long term. It is notable that the Report uses COP work on loss and damage as one of the sticks with which to beat the UNFCCC as a forum ‘without heft’.

On the topic of risk, it is also worth noting that some of the technical solutions TBI advocates are themselves very high risk. Nuclear, obviously. But Solar Radiation Management i.e. global scale manipulation of the atmosphere? Really? TBI say this would need a ‘robust governance framework like that used to manage the proliferation of nuclear weapons’. Golly. Personally I would prefer more emphasis on meatless Mondays or the roll-out of renewable energy.

The cost of Net Zero and the potential of the green economy

Fourth, a critical point about the cost of Net Zero policies and the growth of the green economy. The TBI report says that

‘Net-zero policies, once seen as the pathway to economic transformation, are increasingly viewed as unaffordable, ineffective, or politically toxic. . . . In many economies, the promise of green jobs has not materialised at the scale expected.’

This is the argument that inflamed debate in the UK, and which plays to current political divisions. It is one Climate:Change has explored, in a debate about whether green growth is sub-optimal, and more generally in a Briefing Paper on economic growth and climate compatible development. See those sources for the full discussion, including references to extensive World Bank work on the topic in a range of emerging economies.

Without being overly specific to the UK, the answer seems to be that it all depends, but that good policy which fosters innovation, increases the quantity of factors of production and also increases productivity can be good for both growth and the environment. Climate-related public investment can crowd in private sector investment and accelerate growth. For example, as the World Bank observes of certain developing countries, ‘when investments in a better, more affordable, or more reliable power system encourages investments in businesses and industries.’ That also sounds relevant to the UK. Roll on the review of electricity prices (REMA).

This does not quite settle the argument about whether the UK is going too fast or too slowly towards Net Zero. Climate:Change has a review forthcoming of the Clean Power 2030 Action Plan: cost and feasibility are obvious issues. The Climate Change Committee has also recently published the Seventh Carbon Budget, covering the period 2038-42, on the route to net zero by 2050. It estimates that the ‘net costs of Net Zero will be around 0.2% of UK GDPGross Domestic Product per year on average in our pathway, with investment upfront leading to net savings during the Seventh Carbon Budget period.’  That does not sound too bad.

As many have pointed out, the green economy may or may not be ‘growing at the scale expected’, whatever that might have been, but is growing – three times faster than the overall UK economy, by 10% in 2024, according to the CBI, with a million people in full-time jobs, 22,000 businesses, and gross value added of £83bn.

Where the growth and the jobs are will be an important policy question for the future. Parochially, will Brighton and Hove benefit? Better, what will Brighton and Hove need to do to make sure they do benefit?

I have not covered a new role for philanthropy here, or the functioning of the UNFCCC. However, I have written elsewhere about the need for a mission-driven approach to climate solutions, which is consistent with the call for different investment, and recognises the importance of coalitions that can actually deliver change.  For another day.

To conclude, then, and to be generous, critics are right to say that there is more to do on these topics. There is complacency about the urgency of reducing the use of fossil fuels. The report has a somewhat alarming enthusiasm for technological solutions (look at the cover). It has blind spots on the potential of behaviour change and on the co-benefits of climate action. It does not fully explore the growth potential of the green economy.

On the other hand, there are positives.

• TB is right to say in the Foreword that ‘the inconvenient truth (is) that the climate is changing, and to our detriment – (and) this is one of the fundamental challenges of our time’
• TBI are right to focus on rising emissions in emerging economies, and right to say they need more energy for development.
• The Report is right to say that adaptation needs greater priority.
• It is right to say that the scale and speed of the transition to Net Zero need careful analysis.
• And it may even be right that the UNFCCC/COP process needs to be complemented by new, mission-driven initiatives.

In one final respect, the Report is right to say that ‘the climate transition is not self-sustaining: it relies on policy, economics, capital, and a political narrative to drive action.’